The unity of virtue

The unity of virtue is not an idea of Stoic origin. Yet it is a theory concerning virtue held by the ancient Stoics. In order to be virtuous, one cannot be, in any capacity, vicious. The reasoning behind this is hinted at in a question posed by Socrates to Protagoras when the latter insisted that each virtue (be it Cardinal or subordinate) exists on its own as an individual part:

“What do you mean by ‘part’? Do you mean in the way that the parts of the face, the mouth, nose, eyes, and ears, are parts of the whole (...) or like parts of gold, none of which differs from any of the others or from the whole, except in greatness or smallness?”

Socrates agrees with Protagoras: there are parts of a human face. A face, however, does not exist if it is missing the eye sockets. It does not exist if it is missing a nose, either – at least not a face in the way we conceive of a complete face. The face, then, is emergent from parts but not divisible into parts.

In a similar way, virtue cannot exist without courage, nor without every other virtue because virtue is a thing that requires all its parts in order to be itself. Just as a completed puzzle is not a completed puzzle if one piece is left unplaced, virtue is not virtue if all Cardinal and subordinate virtues are not present and accounted for.

Moral perfection

To be virtuous, then, you must be, in a word, and morally speaking, perfect. Only the Sage is perfect in this way and, as if virtue weren’t enough, there is a second exclusive feature of the Sage: they possess true joy.

Virtue and joy as twin emergent phenomena

Something either exists or it doesn’t. Any state between not existing and existing might be said to nearly exist – just as a face without a mouth is, perhaps, nearly a face, but not quite. Socrates believed virtue couldn’t exist in half measures; would he have thought the same of joy?

Stoic joy is a permanent state

Not to be confused with happiness – a sort of momentary elation when we get what we want, receive a gift, or are enjoying our favorite film – Stoic joy is a permanent state of being. The Sage is joyous, full-stop. Not just on Fridays and holidays, not just on their birthdays or wedding anniversaries, always.

If virtue is emergent from a perfect moral character, and true joy can only be experienced by the Sage, then it would seem that joy is a thing attained after virtue. Does this suggest joy is of a higher order of good than virtue? And, if so, would we Stoics have to start referring to Stoic joy as the only good?

That’s an uphill battle if ever I’ve seen one! Still, I’d like to share a potentially controversial thought:

Is joy the same as virtue?

I believe that joy and virtue are either the same thing, or, at the very least, twin phenomena that emerge always, with no exceptions, together.

If joy exists prior to virtue, then it is not emergent on the same level as virtue. But we know that only the Sage can be truly joyful, so joy cannot manifest prior to virtue. That means Joy exists as an emergent phenoenon of virtue and, if this is true, we are tempted, I think strongly, to replace virtue with Stoic joy as the only good or to propose virtue and joy as twin goods and the ultimate outcome of a perfect moral character. If we do neither of these things, I’m afraid we’re backed into a corner where we must admit to multiple goods: Virtue and joy, but only because it seems clear that joy (if not a twin emergent phenomenon with virtue) would be the ultimate achievement of a perfect moral character.

Something is either the only good, or it isn’t. Something is either at the top of a hierarchy, or it isn’t. If Stoic joy is emergent from virtue, then virtue isn’t the last thing achieved by the Prokoptôn-turned-Sage. If virtue isn’t the last thing achieved by the Prokoptôn-turned-Sage, it becomes penultimate rather than ultimate.

We’re left, I think, with a series of questions that need answering: are virtue and joy the same things described differently? Is joy subordinate to virtue or is virtue subordinate to joy? Is virtue the ultimate expression of moral character or is joy? And lastly: if we Stoics identify the highest attainment of moral character as “the only good”, which is the only good? Virtue or joy?

Tanner is the host of the Practical Stoicism podcast, co-author of the Daily Stoic Journaling program, and owner of Practical Philosophy. He considers himself a "Stoicism Communicator" by trade and creates daily education content related to both Stoicism and philosophy in general.

---