Virtue being the principal good, though not (as some people mistakenly claim) the only good, seems an absolutely central doctrine in Stoic philosophy.  Of the texts by Stoic authors we currently possess, and the several summaries of Stoic doctrine, nearly all of them discuss the cardinal virtues of wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance quite a bit. And although they do not entirely agree in their listings of and references to the subordinate virtues falling under those four principal ones, a student of Stoicism reading across those texts can certainly develop a robust picture of virtues’ full extent from those works.

And yet, in the works of one of the most important Stoic authors we have, Epictetus’ Enchiridion and Discourses, we find surprisingly few references to, let alone systemic discussions of, the virtues. One might even speculate that if Epictetus were the only Stoic author whose works had survived from antiquity, we might get the idea that virtue was only one of a number of important concepts for the Stoics, rather than being an absolutely central one.

Why is this the case? Did Epictetus think that virtue wasn’t really that important a component of Stoic philosophy and practice?  Having given a lot of thought to this on my own and discussion with thoughtful friends and colleagues, my verdict is that this is not the case. But then, why don’t we see as much discussion of virtue and virtues in Epictetus as we do, say, in Seneca, Musonius Rufus, or Marcus Aurelius, or in those authors providing us summaries of Stoic thought like Cicero, Arius Didymus, or Diogenes Laertes?

There are two main reasons that I would say best make sense of this. One of these is a reminder that we need to make when we see something seemingly missing or given little space in Epictetus’ works, and then are tempted to make definitive statements from that absence. And that is that technically, what we have are not Epictetus’ works but rather those authored by his student Arrian, intended to convey to readers the thoughts and frankness of speech of his teacher.  Of the original eight books Arrian wrote, we unfortunately have only four. So there might have been considerably more, longer, and fuller discussions of the virtues in those lost books, or for that matter within the many years of Epictetus’ teachings and conversations that weren’t set down by Arrian.

Another plausible reason might be that Epictetus took it for granted that his students were already conversant enough with Stoic perspectives on virtue already articulated for centuries. He points out in: 

Who of us are not able to discourse competently [technologńsai] about matters good and evil? That some are good, some evil, and some indifferent? The good include the virtues and those things participating in [metekhonta] virtue. - Epictetus, Discourses, 2.9

What is needed, philosophers tell us, is more than simply learning (mathein) doctrines. We also must give attention (melńtń) and engage in discipline or training (askńsis), otherwise all we will be able to do is discuss other people’s doctrines (allotri¶n dogmat¶n).

It's clearly not the case that Epictetus thinks the virtues don’t require any discussion. In fact, if you’re familiar with the breakdowns of cardinal virtues into more specific subordinate virtues, you’ll see him referencing a number of those throughout his works. Look at the chapter already mentioned, where he notes that works or actions (erga) of virtuous sorts preserve that person as virtuous in those ways, and that vicious ones destroy that virtuous character (2.9).  What examples does he use? Virtues of being modest (aidńm¶n) and trustworthy (pistos). Vices of not only the opposites of these, but also being abusive (loidoros), prone to anger (orgilos), and greedy (philarguros, 2.9). This is just one example of many. Throughout his works, if we know where and how to look, there are a number of virtues and vices named, praised, and criticized, and cautioned about.

Virtues and vices do bear importance within Epictetus’ Stoic philosophy, but they get reframed in terms of his own characteristic concepts and emphases. Consider his stress on developing, breaking, and replacing habits, particularly in 2.18, 3.12, and 3.25.  This is precisely one key dimension of training or discipline. And what ultimately are we doing this to? Ourselves, and in particular the most central part of ourselves, our very core, the prohairesis, typically translated as “faculty of choice”, “moral purpose”, or even “will”. 

This is the part that, as he says, makes use (khr¶menon) and takes care of (epimeleitai) everything else, and which can only be hindered (empodizein) by itself or its own distortion (autń d’heautńn diastrapheisa). This leads him to declare that in prohairesis alone (monń hautń) is where vice and virtue develop (ginetai, 2.23). If we want to more fully understand Epictetus’ understanding of what virtues and vices are, and how they are developed or rooted out, we arguably need to focus on his many interconnected discussions bearing upon how we share our prohairesis through learning, attention, and discipline.

Greg Sadler is the president of ReasonIO, a member of the Modern Stoicism Team, an APPAcertified philosophical counselor, and teaches at Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design

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