Selling temperance short

When  people  bring  up  temperance (sophrosunń) within the framework of Stoic ethics, one of the four cardinal virtues recognized not only by the Stoics, but also by multiple other schools of ancient philosophy, they often unfortunately sell it a bit short. Typically that is a consequence from not reading widely or attentively enough in the classic Stoic literature that (fortunately for us in the present) is widely and (in most cases) freely available. There is a converse tendency for many would-be Stoics to rely too much just on quotes from classic Stoic texts (which sometimes turn out to be fake), or on their reading of contemporary popular sources about Stoicism.

Popular writings often overlook the full scope

These books, blog posts, podcasts, and videos nearly always bring up the four cardinal virtues (wisdom, justice, courage, and temperance), and they sometimes provide bits of explanation and application, but all too often they overlook the full scope of these key moral traits.

One might suspect that in many cases, this reflects the authors or producers of this “Stoic content” being themselves not very conversant with the classic Stoic literature and what its authors specifically have to say about the four principal virtues and the many subordinate virtues encompassed by those cardinal virtues. They quite literally don’t know what they don’t know, and so, working within that ignorance of actual Stoic teaching, they pass that on to their readers, watchers, or listeners.

An example

A prime example of this dynamic can be seen precisely in the two most common synonyms used as substitutes for the control”. As it happens, “self-control” is the usual translation of the Greek term enkrateia. Now, why does that matter? Precisely because that is one of the main subordinate virtues of the cardinal virtue of temperance. So calling temperance “self- control” is really substituting the name of a part for the greater whole, perfectly fine as a metonymy for poetic purposes, but reflecting a carelessness if we claim to be studying and applying ethics.

Going to the sources

Where would one find this out? In the first few pages of Arius Didymus’ Epitome of Stoic Ethics. You’ll also see Epictetus and Musonius Rufus using the term enkrateia in their works, not needing to identify it explicitly as a subordinate virtue of temperance, since they could likely count on an audience aware of this basic Stoic concept. (You’ll also find Seneca and Cicero using equivalent Latin terms in their works).

Four sub-virtues of temperance

Arius identifies four main subordinate virtues encompassed by temperance. In addition to self-control, there is also “orderliness” (eutaxia), “propriety” (kosmiotńs), and “modesty” (aidńmosunń), each of which has its own distinctive set of objects and concerns. Diogenes Laertes’ summary of Stoic doctrine in book 7 of his Lives Of The Philosophers echoes Arius’ treatment. These Greek terms, as well as a number of others, some of which are cognates, get used in Musonius’, Epictetus’, and Marcus’ works. Cicero and Seneca use corresponding Latin vocabulary, at points explaining how the terms in the two languages connect. Vercundia covers some of the same ground as aidńmosunń, for example, both denoting what we can call “modesty”.

Seneca and Cicero do quite explicitly extend the scope of  temperance’s subordinate virtues in various works.

One particularly interesting case is in Tusculan Disputations 3.8, where Cicero calls the “fourth virtue” (i.e. temperance) “frugalitas” (a term Seneca himself will use in Letter 115). Later in the same work, he will suggest all of these virtue terms (vocabula), namely “self-controlled” (moderatum), “moderate” (modestum), “temperate” (temperantum), “steadfast” (constantem), and “continent” (continentem), can be referred to frugality (4.16). In On Duties, Cicero devotes some discussion to propriety (decorum), which corresponds to the Greek prepon, and even involves a certain measure of generosity (liberali, 1.27). He also discusses orderliness (ordo), noting it is contained in what the Greeks call eutaxia (1.40).

Sources of information

These few examples, distinctions, and terms I’ve mentioned here are really just the tip of the proverbial iceberg when it comes to working out a more adequate understanding of what the classical Stoics thought the cardinal virtues (or even just the one virtue temperance) involve and extend to. If you want to grasp the deeper submerged structure, we fortunately have a number of classic texts where you’ll find at least the outlines of, and even quite a few substantive discussions elaborating, the fuller Stoic doctrine of the virtues. It’s up to you to take advantage of them, of course, and if you’d like to, you could certainly start by delving deep into what temperance really means and involves for them

Greg Sadler is the president of ReasonIO, a member of the Modern Stoicism Team, an APPA- certified philosophical counselor, and teaches at Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design.

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