A standard, satisfying answer

One common question that gets asked, when people first encounter the listing of the four cardinal virtues of prudence, justice, courage, and temperance, is “but what about the virtue of X? Don’t the Stoics think that’s important?” The X in question will be some good (or at least apparently good) character trait that, in the eyes of the person asking the question, seems important for moral life, character, and development, but which falls though the cracks, you might say, of this canonical listing of four virtues. There is a standard and satisfying answer to this sort of query, which those who have read widely enough in the readily available classic Stoic literature should have ready at hand.

In most cases, the response will be that, in fact, the Stoics do consider that seemingly missing virtue to be something important. It will just be something that is included within or encompassed by one of those cardinal virtues. So for example, modesty is one of the “subordinate virtues” belonging to temperance. And endurance is one encompassed by courage. One of the most often asked-about virtues that beginners worry is left out of the Stoic list of the virtues is kindness. And as it so happens, the classic Stoics very clearly thought that kindness belonged within a proper conception of justice.

How do we know this? We don’t have to guess about or infer it. They explicitly say so in their texts. The cardinal virtue of justice encompasses quite a range of subordinate virtues, and one good place to start— though definitely not stop—is with Arius Didymus’ Epitome of Stoic Ethics. He identifies, and provides short characterizations of four main subordinate virtues of justice (5b2). One of these is what we might most readily associate with the modern term “justice”. It is translated as “fair dealing” (eusunallaxia in Greek). Then there is “good fellowship” (eukoinonńsia) kindness (khrństotńs), and interestingly, piety (eusebia). Diogenes Laertes gives as examples of subordinate virtues Stoics classed under justice two perhaps additional ones (7.1.126): “equality” (isotńs), which incidentally is mentioned in Arius’ definition of good fellowship, and “fairmindedness” (eugnomosunń).

Where to find out more about Stoic justice

These subordinate virtues of justice discussed in summaries of Stoic doctrine get referenced and discussed in differing ways by other Stoic thinkers, generally assuming what we could call the “standard Stoic teaching”, and also expanding upon that schema. Cicero’s On Duties, his reinterpretation of Panaetius’ lost work on that topic, speaks of justice as having two main parts (1.7). One of these is what we can call justice in the strict sense. The other we can call “beneficence” (beneficentia), or if you like, he adds, “kindness” (benignitas) or “generosity” (liberalitas).

Epictetus doesn’t engage in analyses of the cardinal and subordinate virtues in the works we have. Instead, he just mentions them in a number of places he thinks fitting, presumably expecting his audience will already be familiar with the full Stoic schema of the virtues. For example, when discussing a person who gives in to the temptations of adultery, he mentions them losing important characteristics that are part of virtue, for example the person of fidelity (piston) and piety (hosion), as well as neighbourly feeling (gentiasin 2.4). Later he will say that the adulterer destroys certain things (which turn out to be subordinate virtues) within themselves, and people who give in to other problematic desires or emotions destroy others, for instance, the person who gives in to fear or anger (2.10).

Seneca, in On Tranquility of Mind 10, invokes a range of virtues connected with justice and counsels a wide and kind hand (larga et benigna manu) towards others when it comes to justice itself (justitia), calmness with respect to anger (mansuetudine) and humaneness (humanitate). In his lecture 14 Musonius Rufus suggests a person who would be virtuous must cultivate “love of humanity” (philanthropia), “kindness” (khrństotńs), justice (dikaiousunń), as well as be beneficent (euergestikon) and concerned for their neighbour (kńdemnikon . . . tou pelas)

Given more space, we could multiply these references to the various dimensions or aspects of justice, the virtue that stems from and realizes our social nature as human beings, since many passages in the classic Stoic texts discuss or advocate for these parts and portions of justice. But this short excursion ought to be enough not just to put to rest worries that Stoic virtue doesn’t include enough of the good qualities we want to see in ourselves and in others, but perhaps to encourage any who haven’t yet explored those classic texts enough to go to them (or back into them) and find those passages for themselves

Greg Sadler is the president of ReasonIO, a member of the Modern Stoicism Team, an APPA- certified philosophical counselor, and teaches at Milwaukee Institute of Art and Design.

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